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The post-cold war era presented security challenges that at one level are a continuation of the 
cold war era; at another level, these phenomena manifested in new forms. Whether the issues 
of economics and trade, transfer of technologies, challenges of intervention, or humanitarian 
crisis, the countries of the South (previously pejoratively labelled “Third World” or “developing” 
countries) have continued to address these challenges within the framework of their capabilities 
and concerns. The volume explores defence diplomacies, national security challenges and 
strategies, dynamics of diplomatic manoeuvers and strategic resource management of Latin 
American, southern African and Asian countries.
This path-breaking work is a fresh addition to the comparative literature on defence and security 
studies that links concepts and cases, giving voice to scholars related to the Global South and not 
to the Western powers. Emphasising history, political economy, the military, (human) security and 
politics, contributors to this innovative volume demonstrate ‘how the past reappears because 
it is a hidden present’, to paraphrase novelist Octavio Paz. A capita selecta of case studies and 
dialogue engendered thereby hold much promise for academic researchers, theorists, expert 
practitioners, security and political practitioners, policymakers and students. Apart from 
comparative potential, the analyses reflect a purposeful blend of theory, history and substance 
– indeed a worthy and valuable venture in current times. 
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An astute observer of  international politics, in following global events unfolding over the 
past 50 years, remarked not so much tongue-in-cheek that the fallacy of  a unipolar world 
was evident for decades including during the Cold War, and the phenomenon is becoming 
more evident day by day. He suggests that ‘the process of  globalisation to the extent that 
it exists … has been proven to be far from linear. Some general trends may be observed 
by some, but there are visible signs of  deglobalisation in various areas such as political-
military and economic spheres’.1 His statement reminds one of  an argument once posed 
by the sociologist, Anthony Giddens, cautioning theorists that the globalisation of  (social) 
life also implies fragmentation and alienation on various socio- and political levels, which 
is likely to invite conflict rather than peaceful existence.
This collected volume through various contributions touches on how the post-1945, 
post-decolonisation and post-Cold War era transformed power, diplomatic and strategic 
relations and defence diplomacy in the “Global South”. As the assassination of  an Iranian 
general in Iraq by a US drone attack in January 2020 illustrates, the space of  global politics 
remains tense, if  not explosive. If  not for Iranian restraint, this thoughtless act of  aggression 
outside the parameters of  international law could have led to some conflict of  magnitude. 
One may argue that the then Cold War divide made conflict more containable and perhaps 
predictable. The consequences of  the Cold War conflicts in the “Third World”, however, 
were enormous in human and material terms be it through so-called proxy wars or direct 
intervention by powers that perceived themselves as Gladiator-World Saviours (for example, 
the US involvement in Vietnam and US involvement in enforced regime changes in Latin-
America). Despite a brief  moment of  (perhaps delusional) optimism following the end 
of  the Cold War, the present context remains one of  tension, increasing fragmentation 
and fragile relations that can change in a moment through one single un-reflected-upon 
military act.
The United Nations and the Security Council 
On 1 January 2020, the estimated total of  the world population was 7,763,035,303 persons. 
About 36 percent of  these live in China and India. Twelve countries, the United States, 
Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, the Russian Federation, Mexico, Japan, 
Ethiopia, The Philippines, and Egypt in descending order have each more than 100 million 
inhabitants.2 Only three of  these 14 countries have a permanent seat in the UN Security 
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Council. By far the most strategic institution of  the United Nations, it does not reflect 
the real economic, political, economic, military, demographic and the power potential of 
its member states. Especially, the permanent seat of  Great Britain and that of  France are 
remarkable, given the fact that India, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, the entire Middle East 
and the entire Latin America and Caribbean region are not represented. Of  the block of 
the five BRICS countries, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, only three have 
a permanent seat. To manage global conflict, it is perhaps fitting to mention that large 
scale reform around the UN Security Council in terms of  representation is necessary. For 
example, should Brexit become a reality, one can rightly ask whether the UK should still 
have a seat in the Security Council? This would even be more pertinent if  Scotland in their 
next referendum choose to break away from the UK. The Security Council should also 
be extended to include other influential states from the South. Such a step would allow 
for a more inclusive balance of  power and broader consultation on conflict and defence 
matters in the Security Council.
Latin America and the Caribbean
In Latin America, the Cold War represented a period in which military coups became 
institutionalised. The first institutional coup was that of  1962 in Peru. Brazil followed 
in 1964; a coup planned after explicit consultation with both the national elites and US 
government representatives. The Brazilian example gave rise to a succession of  Latin 
American dictatorships, subsequently known as ‘national security regimes’, established 
by right-wing military leaders, in which the appointment of  cabinet members in the 
successive military or civil-military governments went hand in glove with internal 
promotions in one or other branch of  the armed forces. In almost all of  Latin America, 
Peru as exception (1968-1980), national security or ultra-right repressive regimes came to 
power. Even in the first years of  the democratic transitions at the end of  the Cold War, 
there were countries with military-approved governments or co-governments, for instance 
in Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. The late 1980s and 1990s saw transition 
to democracy, notably in Argentina and Chile. The era of  transition from authoritarian 
rule to democracy was not to last forever in all Latin-American states. In Honduras (2009) 
and Bolivia (2019), the armed forces were ‘invited’ or ‘co-invited’ to stage coups. Are we 
potentially seeing a regression of  democratic politics in Latin America? This is a question 
worth contemplation.
In post-Cold War Latin America, dictatorial military regimes had been succeeded by 
elected civilian governments. Democratic transitions considerably diminished the political 
influence of  the armed forces. Sometimes outgoing military governments arranged 
their own transition pacts with the incoming civilian government implying a kind of 
co-governance in the shadows of  power. Arguably, however, military influence in civil 
politics has been substantially diminished. 
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Whatever efforts the outgoing military could mobilise, the final outcome was a significant 
reduction of  political influence, accompanied with sharp cutback of  budget, personnel and 
equipment which occurred in most Latin American countries. This generic transition to 
democracy implied significant change for the once powerful and centralised authoritarian 
regimes, the loss of  the de facto monopoly on intelligence matters and direct influence 
of, or control of  government. In general, it was a process of  gradual but controlled 
conversion. Especially after the Central American peace agreements in the 1990s and 
the electoral defeat of  the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the reduction in military 
spending was dramatic: in cases standing armies of  55,000 to 280,000 officers and troops 
became “miniature” armies of  10,000 to 15,000.
Over the entire region, the armed forces decreased: at present, the armed forces in the 
largest countries and with the largest population, are relatively small: 334,000 in Brazil 
whose population is 212 million; 268,000 in Colombia with a population of  nearly 
50 million; 265,000 in Mexico with a much larger population of  128 million; and 195,000 
in Venezuela with a population of  31 million. The exception seems to be Colombia. The 
bloated armed force of  Colombia is partially explained by its warfare against two guerrilla 
movements (the ERP and until 2016 the FARC) and more than 50 organised private armies 
of  criminal gangs, not counting local militias along the entire Pacific coast.
Predictably, military expenditure is the highest in Brazil. Brazil spends nearly 45 percent 
of  all Latin American and Caribbean national defence spending. Second, third and fourth 
places are held by Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. The long-term percentage of  the 
military budget of  the GDP between 2006 and 2017 is around three percent in the case of 
Colombia and 1,5 percent in the case of  Brazil and Honduras. All other countries spent 
considerably less.3
Only Brazil has a significant military industrial complex and a space programme. Chile’s 
military budget until 2020 was guaranteed by the ten percent of  the copper revenues. This 
new ‘strategic contingence fund’ fuelling the military budget will be administered by the 
Central Bank in Chile, the erstwhile dictatorship of  the Pinochet brutal military rule. 
There was always suspicion about the establishment of  American territorial bases in the 
years of  the Pink Tide of  nationalist-leftists government (c.2000–c.2015). But in May 2017, 
it was announced that American forces will lead an unprecedented joint exercise with 
the armies of  Brazil, Colombia and Peru. The returning military influence in the region 
goes together with an enormous commercial, economic and development assistance 
programme by China. It seems that some balance between East and West is maintained 
in terms of  cooperation, with Chinese investment and commercial cooperation likely to 
increase in the region.
The once important ALBA-country system is diminishing in political influence due to 
falling oil revenues of  Venezuela and the withdrawal of  Ecuador (2018) and Bolivia (2019). 
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In the three remaining larger countries, namely Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, the armed 
forces maintain an “osmosis type” of  relation with the political system and the economy.
During the last two decades of  civilian rule, problems of  persistent inequality, corruption, 
institutional fragility and high levels of  violence (not so much political as criminal) and 
insecurity continued and may open a leeway to military institutions to once again expand 
their influence if  not well managed. Brazil’s new civilian government with a retired army 
captain as president who with nostalgia speaks of  the good years of  dictatorship as does 
his vice-president, a retired general, is an example.
Relations between Latin American countries and the USA remain hovering between 
acceptance and hostility and in cases are contradictory or opaque. The Trump fundament-
al ism and xenophobia against people entering the USA via Mexico remains a bone of 
contention and most likely tensions will rise in magnitude as the US (apartheid-like) 
Wall is erected.
Future developments in the economy play a large role. Any decline in the economy of 
the USA may impact on Latin America and there seem to be indications that an economic 
decline in the USA will not be easily arrested. Capitalism on a credit card has become 
expensive – even untenable. Then there is the uneasy truth to be kept in mind: Major or 
hegemonic powers in (economic) decline, frequently tend to become more aggressive in 
military posture as their own feelings of  insecurity increase. The US is no exception here. 
Developments here are to be carefully monitored and analysed as there is no crystal ball 
to read the future in the region.
Africa
Africa’s history ever since Muslim expansion and Western colonialism has seen many 
torturous events and historical permutations. From an era of  liberation struggles, some of 
them extremely brutal and dislocating such as Algeria and Zimbabwe, many African states 
after independence became autocracies or one party states. Some were more successfully 
run than others. Compare the stable rule of  Tanzania under Julius Nyerere and Zambia 
under Kenneth Kaunda with brutal rule in Uganda and Somalia. Africa became vulnerable 
to the coup syndrome with Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Burkina Faso as examples. 
Some military regimes were stable and reflected a fairly good human rights record such as 
Burkina Faso under Thomas Sankara, a visionary leader. Sankara, however, was not pliant 
to the West (especially France). His outspoken dream of  a Burkina Faso detached from 
French neocolonial economic rule led to a coup d’état and his death, bringing a more 
pliable leader to power who remained in the French sphere of  neocolonial influence. In 
Uganda, under the brutal rule of  the dictator Idi Amin Dada thousands perished until 
Amin was overthrown through the intervention of  Julius Nyerere (Mwalimu) of  Tanzania. 
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In many states, corruption became endemic after independence with Zaire under Mobutu 
and the Central African Republic under Bokassa as examples. There were some success 
stories too. Zambia became independent from Britain without an armed struggle but 
rather a “negotiated independence” after civil resistance and labour strikes. In Botswana, 
under Sir Seretse Khama, the same occurred. Botswana reflects a constitutional state with 
stable rule, little corruption and a good economic growth rate. That corruption on the 
continent is far from defeated can be seen in Nigeria and in southern Africa, South Africa 
under the rule of  Jacob Zuma is an example.
The case studies on Africa included in this volume are all from southern Africa. After 
an anti-colonial struggle that started in 1894 against the German colonisers, Namibia’s 
struggle for liberation continued during the rule of  the Union of  South Africa (1915-1947). 
Sporadic revolts such in northern Namibia by Herero and Ovambo people as well as 
the Bondelswarts rebellion of  1921 in the south of  Namibia were supressed, amongst 
others by using the newly established South African Air Force. When the South West 
African People’s Organization (SWAPO) started their armed struggle in earnest in 1966, 
conflict escalated in the region. The Cold War myopia played no small role in this. South 
Africa, now under minority apartheid rule, was feverishly anti-communist and viewed 
itself  as a Western ally. The “black danger” (Afrikaans: swart gevaar) and a deep dislike for 
communism, the “red danger” (Afrikaans: Rooi Gevaar), conflated into an ideology-driven 
South Africa mobilised to uphold the white state. The struggle by SWAPO and its People’s 
Liberation Army of  Namibia (PLAN) was interpreted as part of  the red danger and total 
communist onslaught (Afrikaans: Totale Aanslag). Others interpreted it as a proxy war. The 
Cold War mania came as manna from heaven for the apartheid government that declared 
itself  as an ally of  the West fighting a communist/Marxist-Leninist threat spearheaded 
by Moscow.
South Africa’s invasion in Angola (1975), with the knowledge of  the USA, was to set the 
scene for further bloodletting. The Republic of  Cuba became involved to support the 
Angolan government. In Angola, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of  Angola 
(MPLA) came to power in November 1975 following the hasty departure of  the colonialist 
Portuguese forces after a bloodless coup against the dictatorship of  Caetano. South Africa’s 
alliance with anti-Luanda forces with covert support by the West for Jonas Savimbi’s rebel 
movement increased the turmoil in Angola. The Soviet Union was forced largely through 
Castro’s commitment to Africa to support the government in Luanda. The military 
support for the MPLA heightened tensions. South African forces claimed that their fight 
against SWAPO guerrillas necessitated strong action. In countering the SWAPO threat, 
South Africa’s involvement was to escalate. SWAPO in turn infiltrated northern Namibia 
relentlessly. South African involvement with covert Western support (i.e. Reagan’s policy 
of  “constructive engagement”) led to economic instability and large scale social dislocation 
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in Angola, the consequences still lasting today. The South African military had a more 
or less permanent presence in Angola through some large-scale operations and perhaps 
hundreds of  smaller ones. Savimbi’s Union for the Total Independence of  Angola (Unita) 
became a favourite proxy of  South Africa and apartheid’s tacit supporters. 
Between 1966 and 1988 South African forces embarked on numerous large scale (semi-) 
conventional operations against SWAPO that also led to military conflicts with MPLA’s 
armed forces (or FAPLA). Especially with Botha in power, the war in Angola gained in 
importance and the State Security Council decided that Pretoria will take all measures, 
diplomatic, economic and especially military to dislodge Swapo and weaken the MPLA 
government. Post 1979, numerous large-scale operations that were undertaken included, 
amongst others, Operation Sceptic (“Smokeshell”), Operation Protea (hundreds of  Swapo 
and Fapla soldiers killed), Operation Daisy (1981), Operations Super, Meebos, Phoenix and 
Boswilger (between 1982 and 1985). The battles at Cuito Cuanavale, Lomba and Tumpo 
of  1987 and 1988 finally brought about a stalemate, perhaps describable as a technical 
defeat to apartheid forces, though at high costs to the Angolan forces. Namibia finally 
became independent after a century of  struggle against colonialism. In accordance with 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 435, Namibia became independent in March 1990 
having seen its first free elections in 1989. Peace could have been achieved earlier, but the 
USA’s policy of  constructive engagement was to lengthen the suffering. 
One of  the historic ironies (if  not a tragedy) of  the Namibian struggle for independence 
is that if  apartheid had relinquished their hold on the mandate for South West Africa in 
die 1970s as demanded by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the debilitating 
conflict that spilled over numerous borders could have been terminated. Instead, against 
the wishes of  the Namibian people themselves, the United Nations and the Non-Aligned 
Movement, Pretoria virtually colonised Namibia as a perceived “fifth province”. The UN 
Security Council remained divided, which prolonged an unnecessary war. In the end, 
Pretoria made a fatal strategic misjudgement. The South African state was not fighting 
“terrorists”, “Marxists” or dupes of  Moscow, but a determined Namibian people intent on 
independence after nearly a century of  struggle. Ironically, the authoritarian government 
and the security establishment of  South Africa became proxies for the US during this period.
Today, Namibia like Botswana, its neighbouring country, is a stable constitutional state. 
It is a dominant party system with SWAPO holding on to power that seems to be slowly 
eroding. In terms of  foreign and defence diplomacy, Namibia is following an independent 
pathway. Managing foreign relations tends to be pragmatic rather than ideological. The 
country maintains relations and exchanges with countries in the EU (especially Germany), 
Russia, China and even North Korea setting an example of  independent thinking on the 
continent. Despite challenges such as poverty, economic growth, and some corruption 
(not comparable with its neighbouring state South Africa), Namibia seems to hold. The 
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Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is small and the purpose is national defence. The country 
faces no external enemies and forms part of  the Southern African Security architecture. 
The next case study, South Africa, as one of  the so-called large states in Africa, followed 
a somewhat different trajectory. Colonial conquest first by the Dutch and then British 
determined its future political development. Indigenous black resistance was subdued 
by military force, whether it came from the Zulu, Xhosa or other people. Even the 
Boer Republics that stubbornly held onto their independence became a target after the 
discovery of  gold in the Transvaal (today Gauteng Province). The Anglo-Boer War (South 
African War) broke out in October 1899 and lasted three torturous years until 1902. The 
extended guerrilla face of  the war was marked by a scorched earth policy by the British 
with thousands of  white and black people dying in concentration camps. What some 
termed the last of  the gentleman’s wars and others the first of  the total wars (but was 
in fact a resource war) again had a major influence on the future. Peace was concluded 
in 1902. The end of  the Anglo-Boer War saw a country marked by struggle between 
white indigenous people (Afrikaners) and the British. The “land of  Boer against Brit” now 
became the land of  Boer and Brit (even if  the relationships between the two races were 
strained and somewhat uneasy). The Union of  South Africa came into being in 1910. 
Despite protest and initially liberal resistance by black people against lack of  citizenship, 
the white controlled government of  Smuts and later the National Party with its policy 
of  racial segregation (apartheid) was not to give way. This was not made easier by the 
rise of  Afrikaner Nationalism that led to the creation of  a state where apartheid as a 
comprehensive project of  social engineering was implemented from 1948 onwards. The 
rights and land of  black people were whittled away with the comprehensive and notorious 
land acts of  1913 and 1936. Despite black people taking part as contingents in both the 
First and Second World Wars together with South African soldiers, no compromise was 
made and right to equal citizenship did not materialise. Passive resistance that marked the 
1950s was to turn into an armed struggle and underground mobilisation by the 1960s. 
Further, despite dozens of  UNGA Resolutions, Pretoria doggedly clung to the apartheid-
ideology and Namibia. The armed struggle, mass mobilisation and underground organi-
sation of  the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress were repressed 
through a barrage of  security laws frequently justified as necessary to suppress “terrorists”, 
Marxist/Leninist types and dupes of  Moscow. The rising Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM) from 1976 onwards, was likewise severely repressed. Under the motto of  Total 
Onslaught and a total national security strategy, the white state moved from resemblances 
of  a police state to a highly militarised state ensconced in a garrison mentality between 
1963 and 1989. Only in 1990 after decades of  struggle, international pressure (a lot of  it 
initially spearheaded by African countries and the Non-Aligned Movement) led to the 
mould being broken. Thousands of  detentions, the torture and killing of  prisoners, and 
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covert operations by shady security forces against activists could not beat the combination 
of  international sanctions, an arms embargo, and boycotts of  South African products, 
diplomatic isolation, disinvestment, mass protest and a limited armed struggle. Things 
were falling apart; the centre could not hold.
Under manifold pressures and a declining economy in South Africa, the liberation 
movements were unbanned in 1990 and a lengthy, tension ridden (and sometimes 
violence filled) period started. The ANC committed itself  to negotiations. South Africa 
saw a negotiated transition to a constitutional state between 1992 and 1996 when the new 
constitution was accepted. South Africa was finally “free” from colonialism and apartheid, 
the latter sometimes described as colonialism of  a special type. The legacy in terms of 
human development and education was horrendous and social challenges abounded. The 
dominant party, the African National Congress, was in government, now facing immense 
challenges on numerous levels. Thanks to a statesman like President Nelson Mandela, 
South Africa returned and was welcomed into the international community. Likewise 
held for Africa, though some states (such as Nigeria and Angola) had some reservations 
about the new kid on the block.
As pointed out in the chapter on South Africa, various experiments with the economy 
on a spectrum from (radical) social democratic and liberal capitalism were undertaken. 
The role and posture of  the security and military forces changed to that of  a force in a 
democracy and some levels of  civil control over the military were instituted. Whereas 
under President Mandela’s foreign policy was aimed at re-entering the global world and 
gaining recognition in Africa, foreign policy under President Thabo Mbeki became more 
directed towards Africa. Mbeki’s ideal of  an African Renaissance and an African Peer 
Review Mechanism was welcomed by some and viewed with scepticism by others on the 
continent. Under the disastrous rule of  Zuma, foreign policy got less attention because of 
internal squabbles, protest against service delivery and expanding corruption; the latter 
phenomenon to such an extent that some talk about state capture. After the fall of  Zuma, 
President Cyril Ramaphosa indeed inherited a precarious state and society. 
South Africa’s defence diplomacy remains mainly value driven (conflict resolution and 
re-construction oriented), favouring negotiation and diplomacy before military force.
The South African Constitution, the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review 
mandate stemming from the 1990s direct the functions of  the Department of  Defence 
and Military Veterans (DDMV) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). 
Promoting security includes regional security through defence cooperation with the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and to provide capacity for regional 
and international peace-support operations.
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As much as foreign policy and defence diplomacy are closely intertwined, so is the notion 
of  creating conditions for peace. Peace diplomacy is not a common concept but related 
to defence diplomacy. Peace diplomacy can be seen as the activities associated with 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Arguably, South Africa’s current military 
diplomatic approaches fall within the ambit of  peace diplomacy. 
Keeping the above in mind, bi- and multilateral involvement by South Africa in peace-
making, governance, development and post-conflict reconstruction processes is taking 
place in at least 18 countries on the continent. Since 2010, South Africa has participated 
in several peace-support operations while the philosophy is to maintain a mission-based 
force. Operational commitments outside the country reflect international and regional 
cooperation aims and peace support operations. 
In discussing South Africa, the African Standby Force (ASF) needs to be mentioned. The 
greatest obstacle in establishing and maintaining such a force remains finances, followed 
by coordination and leadership. Streamlining coordination between the militaries of 
states, regional organisations and the African Union (AU) in terms of  dedicated mission-
orientated operations will need continuous attention. The challenge is to deliver 
effectively on expectations without overstretch. This means a long-term national security 
strategy for South Africa and continuous close alignment with its defence diplomacy to 
facilitate interaction with partner states. Simultaneously, time frames need to be planned, 
closely coordinated and adhered to in efforts undertaken in, or by, SADC and the AU/ASF. 
Within the financial and budgetary constraints and aware of  the asymmetric nature of 
contributing states, a block-by-block approach is necessary, together with a commonly 
accepted strategy derived from an agreed-upon vision. The military leadership of  forces 
to be deployed for peace missions and/or socio-economic reconstruction or policing need 
more say on entrée/exit dates and strategies.
Since 2000, Africa has seen roughly 50 peacekeeping operations in 18 countries. Partnership 
peacekeeping rose in prominence. Peace operations took place both as attempts at conflict 
resolution and retro-actively after conflict broke out or escalated.
These peace operations were conducted by the UN, AU, EU and the Economic Community 
of  West Africa States (ECOWAS), with the UN as the dominant player. Since the AU 
increased its involvement in 2003, it has deployed 40,000 peacekeepers in multipartnership 
or hybrid peacekeeping missions. At any given stage, South Africa contributed close to 
3,000 members to peace operations on the continent, thus around ten percent. The reality 
is that future success will depend on: well-coordinated, planned and executed operations 
that are cost effective within a definite time frame; to what degree asymmetrical states can 
contribute to each mission; the effectiveness of  civil oversight; and to what extent military 
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leaders have input in deployment strategies, time frames (both ‘in’ and ‘out’) versus 
available funding, material capacity and skilled resources. Most importantly, success will 
depend on future multistate cooperation within the current budgetary constraints.
To conclude: the transition to a constitutional democracy allowed South Africa to re-enter 
African and world politics. Between 1990 and 2020 South Africa transformed from a 
hegemon to benevolent partner on the continent. This new diplomatic posture resulted 
in a context where the defence diplomacy of  South Africa in following foreign policy 
complemented the country’s role as peacemaker and potential agent for change. South 
Africa’s involvement in the region and Africa has carved out a role for the country as a 
potential peace multiplier. 
In terms of  the military, the defence posture changed from one of  apartheid aggression 
to a peaceful defence posture. Defence in a democracy was the guideline for the 
re-professionalisation and reform of  the military. Previous liberation movements 
(non-statutory forces), the militaries from the “independent” homelands and the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) were integrated while simultaneously demobilisation 
and rationalisation took place. A Defence Review Process (DRP) was undertaken 
during 1997/1998 which included civil participation. Since then a second defence review 
process was undertaken during 2014/2015. Unfortunately, little of  the latter review’s 
recommendations were implemented. The arms deal that took place to replace obsolete 
arms between 1994 and 1999 (navy and air force especially) was controversial. Some 
suggested that the new arms were far too expensive and more suitable for a military that 
was threatened by conventional foreign aggression and South Africa had no enemies and 
hence faced no immediate or conventional threat. The arms deal was also marked by 
corruption, which marred the process and the image of  the military.
It has to be mentioned though that despite severe budget cuts in defence spending, the 
South African government delivers on its obligations to peacekeeping on the continent. 
In this sense, as well as involvement with regular military operations with neighbouring 
states and naval exercises with navies from Western countries, Latin-America and China, 
South Africa maintains an outward peace-orientated military diplomacy and forms a 
noticeable part of  the southern African and African security architecture.
In terms of  foreign diplomacy, South Africa seems to have a balanced approach in keeping bi- 
and multilateral relations with both East and West as well as African states. Trade relations 
include the UK, Germany, The Netherlands, France, and Spain as well as India, China and 
numerous other states in the East. In BRICS, South Africa keeps its contacts including 
bilateral agreements with Latin-America. In terms of  previous “comrades in arms”, South 
Africa maintains strong relations with Cuba and fully supports the Palestinian people’s 
right to self-determination and attaining its freedom from Israeli repression and domination.
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The third case study on southern Africa remains both interesting and complex, if  not 
somewhat tragic. Zimbabwe (previously Rhodesia) gained independence in 1980 after a 
long and brutal liberation struggle (Chimurenga) against the minority government of  Ian 
Smith. The country had much potential regarding agriculture and the economy, though 
small in measure of  scale when compared to South Africa. The first Prime Minister, 
Robert Gabriel Mugabe, was well educated and committed to socialism and preached 
reconciliation. However, when Mugabe became President he ruled increasingly as a 
dictator, despite initial promises of  reconciliation with former enemies. Josiah Nkomo, 
an erstwhile partner, was sidelined and eventually ousted in a process that included the 
killing of  thousands of  people in western Zimbabwe. Opposition parties were severely 
restricted. Mugabe’s brutal rule received much criticism from the West as well as some 
African states. Mugabe craved and clung to power until he was removed and replaced by 
a new ruler, a previous military ally, now turned president. It is clear, however, that the 
coup-like removal of  Mugabe did not open much space for democracy. For the people 
of  Zimbabwe it remains a case of  democracy deferred. Some argue that it was not such 
much Mugabe’s economic policy (a mixed economy complemented with socialist jargon) 
but Mugabe’s disastrous personal style, corruption and blatant cronyism that led to the 
implosion of  the Zimbabwean economy. Belated land-reform was implemented without 
planning and education/training of  the incumbent farmers. Land reform was also marked 
by corruption and cronyism. Senile and intolerant, Mugabe’s rule undermined governance 
and social equality as well as economic growth while he doggedly centralised power and 
eventually even alienated the military, his strongest support base. Zimbabwe’s struggle 
may have been won for independence, but it is clear the end of  a liberation struggle did 
not mean entrenching democracy. Zimbabwe still faces huge challenges, which some say 
will hardly be corrected by a new president, an ex-military general who is facing sporadic 
protest. In terms of  our case studies, Zimbabwe remains the “weakest link”.
Zimbabwe after the fall of  President Mugabe is not yet in a period of  transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. The “resignation” of  President Mugabe under pressure 
from the military, the latter stopping short of  a coup, does not imply the achievement of 
a stable or sustainable democracy in the near future. What evolved was a change-within-
government and not a regime change. Democratic transition implies a change from an 
authoritarian regime to a (more) democratic regime including a change of  the previous 
ruling party (or incumbent political elite) to new incumbents. The notion of  transition 
implies that civil society, following elite-differences within the ruling party, moves with 
a significant extent into the public space at the moment of  transition. In the political 
stalemate in Zimbabwe, civil society/the public/the civil community went to the streets 
but were not the main dynamo of  the change. The civil community seemed to have been 
merely supporting the military in their attempt to force Mugabe out of  Zimbabwe’s 
power politics. A transition to democracy under current conditions remains remote. 
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To achieve economic sustainability and democracy remains a major challenge; in short, 
democracy has been deferred. Space for citizen politics may open up, but it remains to 
be seen whether the “new”/“old” elite that arose from recent internal differences will 
allow significant change. Any possible transition to democracy was clearly arrested. The 
advent of  real political transition is marked by deep differences between and within the 
ruling elite and a relatively ineffectual opposition. Zimbabwe’s future is full of  both risks 
and possibilities. Unfortunately, the role of  the military which in training and competence 
is quite professional has been tarnished by Mugabe’s rule. In terms of  peace operations 
and the Security Organ for Peace in southern Africa, Zimbabwe remains a factor, albeit 
not strong.
It seems that southern Africa does however reflect a certain level of  stability. One trusts 
that this will remain so and spread to other African regions less fortunate and plagued 
by conflict.
In terms of  the future, a lot remains to be done in enhancing the African Union’s ideals and 
in arresting intra-state wars. Some of  these conflicts are worsened by wars of  greed, wars 
for scarce resources and interstate rivalry. In some cases, foreign intervention worsens the 
situation, such as France in West-Africa and US attacks through drones in Somalia. Other 
states have seen more stability and this will hopefully increase. Much will depend on how 
political leadership deals with these tensions and takes ownership of  peacemaking and 
peacebuilding on the continent while distancing themselves from those core countries 
that intervene in African affairs (in the case of  France, numerous examples exist over the 
past decades).
“The East”
There are some continuing regional and global issues that are likely to dominate the 
politics of  Asia in the years to come. The election of  American President Donald Trump 
forced Asia to confront a new reality. The ‘America First’ doctrine along with Trump’s 
policies towards Iran and North Korea, his efforts to redefine America’s role in NATO 
and the Indo-Pacific region and the trade war with China brought in new uncertainties. 
America’s role in Syria and Iran has had spillover effects on the order in the West Asian 
region. Secondly, several of  the large Asian economies have felt the impact of  the global 
slowdown. This slowdown has been compounded with the US-China trade war. In 
some cases, like India, it would have an adverse impact on the process of  government’s 
reform agenda. 
Third, is the increasingly assertive posture that China has started to take in the South China 
Sea and the Indian Ocean region. It is making efforts to create a footprint in the littoral 
states of  the Indian Ocean with the Belt and Road initiative and close ties with Pakistan in 
I. Liebenberg, D. Kruijt & S. Paranjpe (eds). 2020. Defence Diplomacy and National Security Strategy. Stellenbosch: African Sun Media.
https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928480556/Za Copyright 2020 African Sun Media and the authors
277Epilogue
the form of  China Pakistan Economic Corridor. On one hand, the Chinese investments in 
infrastructure development have been welcomed; however, on the other hand, the Asian 
countries have started to realise the implications of  their inability to repay the loans. In 
the case of  Sri Lanka, for example, the agreement with state-owned China Merchants 
Port Holdings to lease 70 percent stake of  the strategically-located Hambantota port may 
plunge Sri Lanka further into the Chinese debt trap with Colombo turning to Beijing 
for fresh loans. In Myanmar, opposition to Chinese-backed projects is mounting due to 
a feeling that China is only interested in exploiting their natural resources. Myanmar has 
already suspended the Myitsone dam development in northern Myanmar.
Terrorism continues to dominate the discourse on peace and stability. The dimension of 
Islamic State in its various manifestations, especially the intrusive cross-border nature of 
Islamic terror continues to be a source of  concern. This is seen in the context of  Pakistan’s 
policies in Kashmir and India’s refusal to negotiate with the separatist elements in the 
state. The complex battles in Syria that has witnessed several countries participating in the 
struggle, either for or against the Assad government or fight against the Islamic State are 
a part of  this complexity. In Afghanistan, the Taliban continues to dominate the discourse 
on approach to peace and stability in the war-torn country. 
While climate change has been on the global agenda, there is little sympathy for the 
Western activists who have promoted this agenda. These Asian economies are still in the 
process of  industrialisation and need the use of  natural resources like coal and oil. In 
terms of  the BRICS forum, BRICS is growing slowly and has seen some radical changes 
in Brazil and India and much depends on how these modes of  cooperation will evolve. 
There is little doubt that a growing BRICS can contribute to a better future for many on 
the globe. However, managing broader BRICS cooperation and increasing its influence 
will require wise and prudent leadership in the years to come. One may speculate that 
with Russia taking over the Chairmanship, more activity may arise and it will depend on 
how such interaction evolves.
What would be the drivers that dominate the regional scene in Asia in the years to come? 
At the regional level, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East is likely to dominate the 
security agenda in the years to come. The aspirations of  Iran to be recognised as a major 
actor in the region have brought it in direct confrontation with the traditional balance of 
forces dominated by Saudi Arabia. Iran’s skirmishes through its non-state allies in Lebanon, 
Yemen and Iraq and the counter moves by the US and Saudi Arabia are likely to continue 
over a period of  time. In South Asia, India’s concerns regarding cross-border terrorism 
from Pakistan are now being tackled by it in a more aggressive military posture. The 
continuing dominance of  the military establishment in the new government of  Pakistan 
means that this issue will fester in the coming years. This Indian assertive policy is also 
seen against Chinese intrusions along the border. Sri Lankan politics is yet to settle down. 
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The elections in Sri Lanka have thrown up new challenges of  reconciliation between the 
Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority. The Rohingya issue in Myanmar has seen a 
clash between the idea of  national interest as interpreted by Myanmar’s establishment and 
the proponents of  human rights. American reluctance to play a dominant role in the Indo-
Pacific region and a growing concern about China means that the regional powers are 
likely to enter into new security arrangements. Japan and Australia, actors that previously 
avoided active participation in the politics of  Asia, are now shifting their priorities. The 
years to come promise a turbulent time for Asia.
Conclusion
Current global developments are interconnected. Some powers rise while others decline. 
During the last three American presidential terms, especially that of  Trump, relations 
within the NATO military treaty seem to have become one of  increasingly strange 
bedfellows (‘global partners’), one may argue. Is Trump’s defence policy altering the 
entire world system of  alignments, treaties and military and diplomatic conventions? 
Some would argue that under Trump the US is becoming more predictable, namely one 
can foresee an increasingly aggressive posture willing to export violence thousands of 
kilometres outside the US. Others may argue that the US has become more unpredictable. 
The same may, however, apply to a host of  other international actors.
Will other NATO countries continue to tolerate Trump’s one-sided actions and his 
paternalistic approach to the “smaller” NATO partners? Future developments here may 
be interesting as it is clear that relations are growing rather tense as different interests 
and views of  a peaceful world amongst NATO members seem to diverge. An increasing 
aggressive policy by the USA, partly driven by the insecurities around its economic 
decline, may alienate other European partners that more and more seem to work on other 
constructive means to temper international conflicts.
Other powers are rising, some alliances slip away and new ones are formed. What will 
evolve on the global defence terrain with increasingly important international actors such 
as Brasilia, India, China, North Korea, Turkey and Iran? While one hegemon declines, 
other states may play a role in a multipolar world or a new hegemon may arise.
Is this the end of  the beginning or the beginning of  the end? Indeed, we face a tense 
future and a problematic if  not potentially dangerous/disastrous changing world order 
as globalisation and de-globalisation seem to become intertwined phenomena. Only time 
can tell as historical and contemporary political and military permutations evolve.
The Editors
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